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I. Introduction

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution1 provides:
“Nor (shall a person) be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”2 Early in the country’s history, courts defined public
use very narrowly and allowed for the Public Use Clause to be satisfied
with takings that satisfied government purposes such as roads, schools, and
forts.3 In 1789, the Supreme Court started to marginally broaden that
definition of public use.4 More recently, the Court in three cases, Berman
v. Parker,5 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,6 and Kelo v. City of New
7
London, has dramatically expanded the types of takings that would satisfy
the clause.8 This trilogy of cases leaves states with the clear understanding
that the Supreme Court will give strong deference to their determination of
9
what constitutes a public use.
One of the most unpopular Supreme Court decisions in history,10 Kelo
11
In what
reignited a long dormant national interest in property rights.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See id. (setting forth what is now known as the Public Use Clause).
3. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 512 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that early takings were for uses that were unchallenged as to public
use).
4. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1789) (“[A] law that takes property from A
and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature
with such powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it.” (emphasis
deleted)).
5. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954) (ruling that private property could
be taken for a public purpose with just compensation).
6. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (ruling that a Hawaii
Land Reform Act of 1967 was constitutional as the condemnations of lessor’s property and
the subsequent distribution of that property to lessees satisfies a public purpose).
7. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469 (ruling that the governmental taking of property from
one private owner to another in furtherance of economic development constitutes a
permissible public use under the Fifth Amendment).
8. See id. at 482 (stating that the Court’s jurisprudence has evolved over time with
respect to public use).
9. See Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 240 (citing Old Dominion Co. v. United
States, 269 U.S. 55, 66, 46 S.Ct. 39, 40, 70 L.Ed. 162 (1925)) (stating that great deference
will be given to the legislature in determining public use) (citing Old Dominion Co. v.
United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925)).
10. See The Civil Rights Implications of Eminent Domain Abuse: Testimony Before
the United States Commission on Civil Rights (2011) (statement of Ilya Somin, Professor of
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some scholars referred to as “a uniting of strange bedfellows,” traditionally
unaligned groups such as the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP), the American Association of Retired People
(AARP), the Property Rights Foundation of America, and the American
Farm Bureau all came together to oppose a further broadening of the Public
Use Clause.12 The brief of amici curiae submitted on behalf of the
NAACP, the AARP, the Hispanic Alliance of Atlanta County, and the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference noted that ethnic and racial
minorities, the elderly, and the indigent have been disproportionally
impacted by eminent domain, and the expansion of the Public Use Clause
was particularly harmful to those least able to oppose such takings.13 In his
dissent in Kelo, Justice Thomas cited these arguments as reasons why the
Public Use Clause should not be broadened, explaining that the Kelo
decision would only exacerbate the harm these groups have already faced.14
Since Kelo was decided, forty-two states have passed legislation to
15
Many of the
provide varying levels of protection for property owners.
reform laws were passed in either 2006 or 2007, when public animosity to
16
Since that time, scholars have
the Kelo decision was still at its peak.
begun to criticize those laws as rushed attempts to appease public sentiment
Law, George Mason University) (explaining that polls showed over 80 percent of the public
opposed the Court’s decision) (on file with the WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL. RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
11. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW TO REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY 3 (Geoffrey R. Stone ed., 2008) (demonstrating the
decade long complacency with property rights had ended).
12. See Nick Gillespie, Kelo Makes Strange Bedfellows, Part 234, REASON, Jul. 1,
2005, http://reason.com/blog/2005/07/01/kelo-makes-strange-bedfellows (explaining the
seemingly unlikely political alliances that were formed as a result of the publicity
surrounding Kelo v. City of New London) (citing Carolyn Lochhead, Foes in Congress
Unite in Defense of Property, SAN. FRAN. CHRON., Jul. 1, 2005, http://www.sfgate.com
/politics/article/Foes-in-Congress-unite-in-defense-of-property-2658728.php) (on file with
the WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL. RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
13. See infra note 29 and accompanying text (demonstrating the arguments made in
the NAACP-AARP Amicus Brief arguing that the widening of the Public Use Clause has
had a detrimental impact on those most affected by eminent domain).
14. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 522 (2005) (Thomas, J.
dissenting) (explaining the harm that the widening of the Public Use Clause has already had
on minorities and the poor, and predicting that a future expansion of the clause would
continue such harm).
15. See Somin, supra note 10 (explaining that forty-two states have enacted legislation
protecting property rights after 2005).
16. See id. (noting that reform measures were passed soon after Kelo as a response to
that decision).
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that fail to provide meaningful change.17 Of those states that have enacted
reform, Virginia may be seen as a model of success.18 In 2006 the Virginia
General Assembly resisted comparatively weak, hasty legislation, choosing
19
On February 13,
instead to pass more comprehensive reform in 2007.
2012, the Virginia General Assembly passed a constitutional amendment to
protect both public use and just compensation and passed additional
legislation allowing for access and business losses to be considered in
determining just compensation.20 These actions make Virginia the only
state to defeat weak legislation, pass strong comprehensive reform, and then
pass a second round of even stronger legislation accompanied by a
constitutional amendment.21
Though Virginia has seen success in post-Kelo reform, this Note
argues that Virginia does not offer the perfect model for other states that are
considering future reform measures. While the results in Virginia may
appear laudable, they are flawed in a critical area: Virginia did not include
those citizens most affected by eminent domain in its reform process.22
The groups that may have made the strongest historical arguments against
the broadening of the Takings Clause in Kelo were inactive in the Virginia
process.23 The legislative leaders who represent those disproportionally
17. See id. (“Unfortunately, the majority of the new reform laws are likely to be
ineffective, imposing few or no meaningful constraints on the use of eminent domain.”).
18. See infra notes 171–174 and accompanying text (explaining that Virginia was the
only state to kill weak reactionary legislation in 2006, pass comprehensive reform in 2007,
and then pass a constitutional amendment and additional reform legislation).
19. See infra notes 175–178 and accompanying text (noting that the legislation
proposed by Delegate Terrie Suit in 2006 was much less comprehensive than the reform bill
that became law in 2007).
20. See Constitutional Amendment: Taking or Damaging of Private Property for
Public Use, S.J. Res. 3, 2012 Leg., 2012 Sess., 2d Reference (Va. 2012) (Floor: 02/13/12
Senate: Read Third Time and Agreed to by the Senate (23-Y 16-N), available at
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+SV0393SJ0003+SJ0003 (last visited
Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the constitutional amendment passed the Senate of Virginia on
February 13, 2012)) (on file with the WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
21. See generally Calvert G. Chipchase, Christian K. Adams & Kamaile A. Nichols, A
State-by-State Survey of Public Use Standards, in EMINENT DOMAIN: A HANDBOOK OF
CONDEMNATION LAW 153 (William Scheiderich et al. eds., 2011) (surveying all post-Kelo
state action and showing that Virginia’s could be seen as the strongest state reform
measures).
22. See discussion infra Part IV.C (explaining that in Virginia those most affected by
the broadening of the Public Use Clause were not active in reform measures).
23. See infra note 248 and accompanying text (explaining that groups that commonly
advocated for ethnic and racial minorities, the elderly, and the indigent, were absent from the
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impacted, did not encourage or support reform.24 This Note argues that for
future eminent domain reform measures to be successful, legislative results
25
cannot forsake those most disproportionally affected by eminent domain.
Part II of this Note will examine the evolution of the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. It will examine how the clause was first broadened as early as 1798 but was substantially changed in Berman v. Parker,
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, and Kelo v. City of New London. Part
III will focus on the disproportionate impact eminent domain has had on
racial and ethnic minorities, the indigent, and the elderly. This discussion
will focus primarily on Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit
and the arguments outlined in the amicus brief submitted by the NAACP
and AARP. Part IV will examine the post-Kelo legislative response. It will
note why Virginia may appear to be a leader in eminent domain reform but
will then discuss why the state’s model is flawed. Part V will propose a
stronger model for eminent domain reform and explain why a reuniting of
“strange bedfellows” is beneficial to the reform process. Part VI concludes
by supporting continued reform and advocating why the reform process
should follow a more inclusive model than that seen in Virginia.
II. The Evolution of the Public Use Clause
The argument presented in this Note is posited on the assumption that
the need for post-Kelo reform cannot be fully appreciated without first
understanding the history of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
which states: “Nor (shall a person) be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”26 The Supreme Court has interpreted this
language to mean that “the taking must be for a ‘public use’ and ‘just
27
compensation’ must be paid to the owner.” From this section of the Fifth
Virginia reform process).
24. See discussion infra Part IV.C (discussing how in Virginia many legislators who
represent those most affected by a widening of the Public Use Clause did not support reform
measures).
25. See discussion infra Part V (proposing a better model for eminent domain reform
that includes those most affected by a widening of the Public Use Clause).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231–32 (2003) (explaining the
Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment).
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Amendment, two critical questions arise: what constitutes a public use and
how much compensation is necessary to be just?28 How these questions are
answered by both the judicial and legislative branches, affects all property
owners and specifically those property owners who are members of racial
or ethnic minorities, are elderly, or are economically underprivileged.29
A. The Early Cases
As early as 1798, the Court started determining the boundaries of the
public use doctrine.30 Justice Chase wrote,
An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the
great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a
rightful exercise of legislative authority . . . [A] law that takes property
from A. and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a
people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it
31
cannot be presumed that they have done it.

Since Justice Chase’s statement, the Supreme Court has addressed the
question of when and for what reason the state can take A’s property and
32
transfer it to B numerous times.
Very early after the passage of the Bill of Rights, states used eminent
domain for purposes such as public roads, railroads, and parks.33 In the
28. See Mary Massaron Ross & Hilary Ann Ballentine, Public Use and Public
Purpose, in EMINENT DOMAIN A HANDBOOK OF CONDEMNATION LAW 1 (William
Scheiderich et al eds., 2011) (explaining that the broadness of the concept of the public use
still continues to be a threshold issue in eminent domain law); see also Terry C. Frank,
Compensation, in EMINENT DOMAIN A HANDBOOK OF CONDEMNATION LAW 17 (William
Scheiderich et al eds., 2011) (explaining that the just compensation issue represents the
second prong of the major ongoing legal question in eminent domain).
29. See Brief of National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)
(No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2811057 at 7 [hereinafter NAACP-AARP Amicus Brief] (stating
that the burden of eminent domain has, and will, continue to fall disproportionately on racial
or ethnic minorities, the elderly, and the economically underprivileged).
30. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1789) (demonstrating the Court questioning
the boundaries of the Public Use Clause).
31. Id.
32. See generally Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896); Fallbrook
Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158, 164 (1896); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold
Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984);
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)
(demonstrating the Court's evolving jurisprudence on the public use question).
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majority of these early takings cases, the public use requirement was not
called into question.34 The so-called “Mills Acts,” which were among the
earliest examples of legislation authorizing a taking of private property for
a private use with public benefit, could be seen as a starting point for the
broadening of the public use requirement.35 These early 19th century
statutes stated that mill owners could dam a part of a river if they paid those
36
In the mill cases, the Court first
upstream for the flooding damage.
started weighing the value of one private property interest against another
and found the taking of A’s property for B’s benefit was thought to provide
value not only for B but for all.37 Borrowing from the logic of these
statues, the Nevada Supreme Court in Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v.
38
allowed for roads to be condemned for mining purposes; here
Seawell
too, as private property was taken for a private use with public economic
benefit, the court found public use.39 The court rationalized, “the object for
which private property is to be taken must not only be of great public
benefit and for the paramount interest of the community, but the necessity
must exist for the exercise of eminent domain.”40 Richard Epstein, the
notable property rights scholar, explained in Takings, that these early cases
work because two requirements are satisfied: necessity and division of the
surplus.41 The necessity principle states that forced exchanges are to be

33. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 512 (2005) (Thomas, J.
dissenting) (explaining that early takings were for uses that were unchallenged as to public
use).
34. See id. (stating that with the early taking cases there was little debate over the
public use).
35. See id. (stating the Mill Acts brought about early Court decisions regarding the
taking of private property for public use).
36. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 170–76 (Harvard University Press 1985) (explaining that with the Mill
Acts, the owner of a mill could dam a waterway and compensate the owner of property that
abuts the river if the property were to flood).
37. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 512 (explaining that party acting as the taker was acting on
behalf of the public, in that any member of the public could receive equally the benefit of the
mill).
38. See Dayton Gold & Silver Min. Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 395 (1876) (ruling
that a private mining road can satisfy the public use requirement).
39. See id. (finding a public value in a private mining road).
40. Id. at 411.
41. See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 173 (explaining the Court's logic in determining
when a private taking constituted a public use).
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limited to those cases where there is some situational necessity.42 The
division of surplus principle states that the value of the taking must be
redistributed to all those in the community, including the owner who is the
subject of the take.43 Thus the benefit or value must be distributed to all
including A, the original property owner.44
Another early case that demonstrates the Supreme Court’s ability to
weigh the respective value of two private properties in a takings issue is
Miller v. Schoene.45 There the state cut down ornamental cedar trees
without compensating the owner because cedar trees were host to a
46
harbored fungus, which could be dangerous to local apple trees. In that
case, for the first time, the Supreme Court blurred the state’s police power
with the public use, stating, “upon the destruction of one class of property
in order to save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of
greater value to the public.”47 From cases like these the idea of the comparison of values was born: the government can take A’s property for B’s
48
purpose, if B provides greater good to the public.
B. Berman v. Parker
The modern debate about the boundaries of the Public Use Clause and
whose role it is to define what types of takings constitute public use is at the
center of the Berman-Midkiff-Kelo trilogy.49 In Berman v. Parker the Court
drastically widened the public use requirement, allowing it to be satisfied
by a Washington D.C. plan for “comprehensive redevelopment” or urban
renewal.50 The plan did not target specific homes or businesses that were
42. See id. (explaining how in viewing a private taking for a public use, the Court
determines what satisfies the necessity requirement).
43. See id. (“The basic theory of public use demands that in forced exchanges the
surplus must be evenly divided.”).
44. See id.
45. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (showing that the Court weighed
the value to the public of apple verses cedar trees).
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11 (stating that the Court commits a fundamental error
when it becomes preoccupied with the value question).
49. See id. at 83 (explaining that in Kelo the broad language of Berman and Midkiff
was used as the Court again tried to determine the boundaries of public use).
50. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (demonstrating a public use in urban
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not well cared for; instead, the plan called for the taking of many houses
and businesses that were in zones where there was vast blight and urban
51
decay regardless of the condition of those specific properties. The takings
resulting from Berman ultimately displaced an entire ethnic community.52
In 1953, prior to the decision in Berman, a three-judge panel in
53
Scheider v. District of Columbia held that “private property could be
taken to abate slum conditions, present or reasonably expected, even if the
property thereafter was conveyed into private hands.”54 But in Scheider,
the District Court for the District of Columbia noted, “One man’s land
cannot be seized by the Government and sold to another man merely in
order that the purchaser may build upon it a better house or house which
55
meets the Government’s idea of what is appropriate or well-designed.”
Mr. Berman, the losing plaintiff in the case, fell in between the two rules
from Scheider; he was the owner of a non-blighted store, located in a
blighted district.56 Mr. Berman’s store was taken and immediately transferred to another private owner in its exact condition.57 This was a further
departure from a strict interpretation of the public use requirement,
applying the Mills Act test, not only was the necessity of the taking
questionable, but Mr. Berman received arguably no public value.58 Even if
the housing authority were to comprehensively revitalize the neighborhood,
Mr. Berman received no value share for the direct transferal of his
property.59 The Supreme Court unanimously justified the public use by
renewal).
51. See id. (showing that an individual property did not have to be blighted to fall
within a blighted zone).
52. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 522 (2005) (Thomas, J.
dissenting) (“Over 97 percent of the individuals forcibly removed from their homes by the
‘slum-clearance’ project upheld by this Court in Berman were black.”).
53. See Schneider v. Dist. of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1953) (holding that
a blight taking can satisfy the public use requirement).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 178–79 (stating Mr. Berman’s store itself was not
blighted, but the store was located in a blighted zone).
57. See id. (explaining that Berman is an unusual case as the property was left in its
original condition and transferred to another private owner).
58. See id. (explaining that Mr. Berman did not receive a portion of the shared value
of the taking).
59. See id. (“But the situation is not improved when slum property is converted into
public housing projects, where financial and other eligibility restrictions are imposed upon
candidates for rental.”).
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deciding that the taking fell under the police power.60 The Court stated that
the redevelopment plan was comprehensive, not targeting a specific
property owner, and the conditions of the condemned properties, as a
whole, were so poor that this police power was necessary for the public
good.61
Berman clearly signaled the Supreme Court’s willingness to defer the
62
public use question to the legislature. Setting out the Court’s role in
determining public use, Berman established that, “the role of the judiciary
in determining whether that power being exercised is for public purpose is
an extremely narrow one.”63 To satisfy the public use requirement, the
Court simply read the text of the legislation:
Owing to technological and sociological changes, obsolete lay-out, and
other factors, conditions existing in the District of Columbia with
respect to substandard housing and blighted areas, including the use of
buildings in alleys as dwellings for human habitation, are injurious to
the public health, safety, morals, and welfare, and it is hereby declared
to be the policy of the United States to protect and promote the welfare
of the inhabitants of the seat of Government by eliminating all such
injurious conditions by employing all means necessary and appropriate
64
for the purpose.

In giving almost complete deference to the legislature, the Supreme
Court affirmed the legislative finding of public use, stating, “If those who
govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation’s Capital should be
beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that
stands in the way.”65
While the Court relegated to the legislature almost complete autonomy
in finding and determining public use, it additionally conceded that the best
public use could actually be for use by another private property owner.66
The Court stated, “The public end may be well or better served through an
60. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (stating that because of the mass
blight produced unsafe conditions, the police power was necessary).
61. See id. (explaining the degree of the blighted property allowed for the police
power).
62. See id. at 32 (“Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature
has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 28.
65. Id. at 33.
66. See id. at 34 (explaining that in addition to passing the public use question to the
legislature, the Court clearly stated that public use could be found with a private owner).
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agency of private enterprise than through a department of government—or
so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say that public ownership is the
sole method of promoting purposes of community redevelopment projects.”67 Where there is a well-kept property or even a well-kept street or
city block in a larger area deemed to be blighted, the Court stated that if the
non-blighted owner “were permitted to resist these redevelopment programs
on the ground that his particular property was not being used against the
public interest, integrated plans for the redevelopment would suffer
greatly.”68 Lastly, in granting far more comparative value to the Just
Compensation Clause than the Public Use Clause the Court states, “The
rights of these property owners are satisfied when they receive that just
compensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the
taking.”69 Thus, the Court comes close to concluding that the Fifth Amendment right is protected almost exclusively by just compensation.70
Prior to Berman the Court allowed the legislature to use the police
71
power to value uses comparatively. After Berman, the Court yields almost complete deference to the legislature in determining the public use,
allowing for a private to private taking if it is part of a larger redevelopment
scheme, and permits non-blighted property to be taken if the taking is
helpful to the larger redevelopment plan.72
C. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff
The Supreme Court in Berman took these major steps in reshaping and
broadening public use jurisprudence, only to broaden the Public Use Clause
further in 1980 with Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.73 In Midkiff
67. Id.
68. Id. at 35.
69. Id. at 36.
70. See id. (explaining that the rights of property owners are protected when the owner
receives just compensation).
71. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (showing that the Court exercised
the police power when using the Takings Clause by making a comparison of the value of
two types of trees).
72. See generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
73. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (stating that the
Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967 was constitutional as the condemnations of lessor’s
property and the subsequent distribution of that property to lessees satisfies a public
purpose).
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local landowners questioned whether the Public Use Clause was violated by
Hawaii’s Land Reform Act of 1967.74 This act created a “land
condemnation scheme whereby title in real property was taken from lessors
and transferred to lessees in order to reduce the concentration of land
ownership.”75 In this system, the Hawaii Housing Authority could directly
condemn the private property of the owner and transfer it to the lessee,
76
In identifying the public
without the lessee ever leaving the property.
purpose, the Court found that it was:
to reduce the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly
traceable to their [Hawaiian] monarchs. The land oligopoly has,
according to the Hawaii Legislature, created artificial deterrents to the
normal functioning of the State’s residential land market and forced
thousands of individual homeowners to lease, rather than buy, the land
77
underneath their homes.

In Midkiff, Justice O’Conner, writing for the Court, stated that such a
use did not violate the public use requirement, which “is coterminous with
78
the scope of the sovereign’s police powers.” The Court, citing Berman,
stated that the role the Court plays in reviewing a legislature’s judgment
about what constitutes a public use is “an extremely narrow one.”79
Deference should be given to the legislature’s public use determination,
80
“until it is shown to involve an impossibility.” The Court summarized its
position of reviewing the Public Use Clause by stating that it “will not
substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes
‘public use’ unless the use is palpably without reasonable foundation.”81
Answering any question of whether property must be used exclusively by
the public, the Court stated, “The mere fact that property taken outright by
74. See id. (showing that the petitioners filed suit asking that the act be declared
unconstitutional).
75. See id. at 233 (explaining that under the condemnation scheme real title for the
property transfers from the owner who is the lessor).
76. See id. (noting that the lessee who receives title to the property never has to leave
the occupied property).
77. Id. at 241–42.
78. Id. at 230.
79. See id. at 240 (1984) (stating the role the Court will take in determining whether
public use has been satisfied) (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).
80. See id. (stating that great deference will be given to the legislature in determining
public use) (citing Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925)).
81. Id. at 241 (citing United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680
(1896).
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eminent domain is transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries
does not condemn that taking as having only a private purpose.”82 The
Court ultimately held that the Act was allowable because it was “rationally
83
In Berman the Court granted
related to a conceivable public purpose.”
deference to the legislature to find public use in a massive redevelopment
plan while private commercial property was taken and given to other
private commercial users, declaring that its role in determining public use is
extremely narrow.84 In Midkiff the Court granted deference to the legislature to find public use in the need to control “a perceived economic
oligopoly” owning too much property that was originally owned by the
Kamehmeha Hawaiian royal family.85 These cases left a question for the
Court in Kelo to answer: When, if ever, will a legislative determination of
86
public use not be upheld?
D. Kelo v. City of New London
In Kelo v. City of New London, the Court was asked to decide if
Susette Kelo and fourteen other landowners could be forced from their
properties when the city of New London, Connecticut acting as the
condemnor, found a public use in a comprehensive development plan that
did not specify the future uses of the properties being acquired.87
The Kelo Court, following precedent set by Berman and Midkiff,
88
upheld “longstanding deference to the legislature.” In reaching its
decision that the public use requirement was satisfied, the Supreme Court in
Kelo first recognized that a pellucid shift had occurred in public use

82. Id. at 243–44.
83. Id. at 241.
84. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (stating that the role of the judiciary
will be very narrow in determining if a use deemed by the legislature to be a public use
satisfies the requirement).
85. See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 82–3 (explaining how the majority of the Court
found a public use in Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff).
86. See id. (noting that Berman and Hawaii Housing Authority provide a backdrop for
when comprehensive development satisfies the public use requirement).
87. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005) (stating the
background behind the public use question in the case).
88. See id. at 469 (stating that the Court will define public use broadly and will
continue in its practice of granting deference to the legislature).
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jurisprudence.89 In noting that the Court now rejects any literal requirement
for public use, Justice Stevens explained that the narrow “use by the public”
90
definition has eroded over time. He wrote, “Not only was the ‘use by the
public’ test difficult to administer . . . but it proved to be impractical given
the diverse and always evolving needs of society.”91 Stevens found public
purpose satisfied through the collective macro project, which both increased
92
jobs and increased tax revenue. Stressing the Court’s strong deference to
the legislature, Stevens wrote, “For more than a century, our public use
jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in
favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public
needs justify the use of the taking power.”93
Specifically addressing the question of whether the forcible transfer of
a property from one private owner to another private owner constituted a
public use, Stevens wrote, “Quite simply, the government’s pursuit of a
94
However,
public purpose will often benefit individual private parties.”
the Court did note some limit on a private-for-private taking, allowing only
those takings which are part of a “carefully considered development
plan.”95 Novel to Kelo, the petitioners argued that for there to be a public
use there should at least be a reasonable certainty that the public benefit
would actually occur.96 The Court rejected this requirement, in part be97
cause it would “represent a departure from precedent.” The Kelo Court,

89. See id. at 482 (stating that the Court’s jurisprudence has evolved overtime with
respect to public use).
90. See id. at 480 (showing that prior to the Court’s ruling in Strickley v. Highland Boy
Gold Mining Co., a narrower standard for public use was used).
91. See id. at 469, 479 (explaining why the Court no longer uses the “use-by-thepublic” test).
92. See id. at 469–70 (explaining that collectively an increase in tax revenue, job
growth, and general economic rejuvenation will constitute a public use).
93. Id. at 483.
94. Id. at 485.
95. See id. at 478 (explaining that the City of New London’s plan satisfies the public
use requirement because it is part of a carefully considered plan as compared to an
individual private-for-private taking that is not part of a greater scheme).
96. See id. at 487 (“Alternatively, petitioners maintain that for takings of this kind we
should require a ‘reasonable certainty’ that the expected public benefits will actually
accrue.”).
97. Id.
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closely following the Berman doctrine, chose to “decline to second-guess
the wisdom and means the city has selected to effectuate its plan.”98
The Kelo decision left property owners vulnerable in any state where
public use was not well defined, as the Court would uphold the taking of
one’s private property for another private use, even if there were not a
99
reasonable certainty that a public use would occur. Theoretically, under
this decision, as long as just compensation would be paid to A, A’s private
property could be taken by the State and given to private property owner B,
even though there would be no guarantee of public benefit in this
transfer.100
III. Eminent Domain and its Impact on Ethnic and Racial Minorities, the
Indigent, and the Elderly
The relaxed reading of the Public Use Clause is problematic to all
landowners, as it introduces major instability to concepts underlying basic
property rights.101 While the Supreme Court has allowed the State to determine what qualifies as a public use, history shows that ethnic and racial
minorities, the elderly, and the poor are more often subjected to questionable takings.102
A. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit infamously demonstrates the danger minority groups can face when the Court allows the state
98. Id. at 469−70.
99. See supra notes 69–98 and accompanying text (explaining how the ruling in Kelo
could affect a property owner who lives in a state where reform measures were not passed).
100. See supra notes 69–98 and accompanying text (explaining how the ruling in Kelo
could affect a property owner who lives in a state where reform measures were not passed).
101. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 17 (stating that people are more likely to want to
live in a society where they have secured understandings about their future liberties).
102. See MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, EMINENT DOMAIN AND AFRICAN-AMERICANS:
WHAT IS THE PRICE OF THE COMMONS 1–2 (stating that since slavery, African-Americans
have always been threatened disproportionately with legalized takings); see also The Civil
Rights Implications of Eminent Domain Abuse: Hearings Before the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights 5 (2011) (testimony of Ilya Somin, Assoc. Professor of Law, George Mason
Univ.) (stating that as a result of historical political weakness, African-Americans have been
the victims of blight and economic development takings).
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to determine the boundaries of the public use requirement on an ad hoc
basis.103 Poletown is a case similar to Berman in that an entire ethnic
community was displaced because of a taking with a questionable public
104
The case demonstrates perhaps the State’s most offensive use of the
use.
power of eminent domain against an ethnic community.105 Poletown was
the name of a section of Detroit inhabited by a large, predominately Polish
106
In 1980 General Motors Corporation informed the city of
community.
Detroit that it was planning to relocate two of its Cadillac plants to Dallas,
107
Due to the threat of losing approximately 6,000 jobs, the Detroit
Texas.
Economic Development Corporation met with General Motors to inquire
into specifically what type of parcel the industry would need in order to
prevent this relocation.108 Upon such identification, the taking was allowed, forcing the removal of hundreds of Polish families from their
neighborhood and causing $200 million in property to be transferred to the
General Motors Corporation for only $8 million.109 To find public use, the
Michigan Supreme Court in Poletown employed a balancing test, determining that “whatever the losses in subjective value to the private
property owners in this cohesive economic neighborhood, they are offset by
the benefits that accrue to the workers who continue in their jobs, the social
benefits to other firms, the unemployment compensation that is not drawn
103. See David K. Bowersox, The Public Use Limitation in Eminent Domain: Poor
Relation to the Constitution’s "Poor Relation," in CURRENT CONDEMNATION LAW: TAKINGS,
COMPENSATION, AND BENEFITS 255, 268–80 (Alan T. Ackerman & Darius W. Dynkowski
eds., 2d ed. 2006) (stating that the Court found public use by deferring to the condemnor,
citing the taking was for a public purpose).
104. See NAACP-AARP Amicus Brief, supra note 29 (stating that both the takings in
Poletown and in Berman destroyed ethic communities).
105. See id. (commenting specifically about the abuse of the Polish neighborhood in
Poletown).
106. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 470
(Mich. 1981) (stating that the community subject of the take was a thriving ethnic
neighborhood).
107. See Thomas S. Ulen, The Public Use of Private Property: A Dual-Constraint
Theory of Efficient Governmental Taking, in TAKING PROPERTY AND JUST COMPENSATION:
LAW AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES OF THE TAKINGS ISSUE 186 (Nicholas Mercuro ed. 1992)
(showing the factual process by which Detroit found public use).
108. See id. (explaining the steps the City of Detroit and the Detroit Economic
Development Corporation took to entice the General Motors Corporation to stay in the City
of Detroit).
109. See id. (explaining the final package that the City of Detroit offered in order to
persuade the General Motors Corporation not to leave Detroit).
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out of the public fisc, [sic] and so on.”110 In the taking, Detroit, aided by
General Motors, defined the public value as a retention and increase of jobs
111
However, the landowners who lost their homes, their neighto the city.
bors, and their community did not benefit proportionally in this value
sharing.112 Poletown is a direct example of what can and does happen
when local elected officials are left as the final and only guardians of
113
Local leaders took private property from many private
property rights.
citizens, who collectively formed an ethnic neighborhood, and gave it to a
major business, in what the leaders deemed as a comparatively better use of
the property.114 Because there was a loose legislative restriction on what
constituted a public use, the Michigan Supreme Court found that this use, in
which A asked the sovereign to take B’s property and redistribute to A,
qualified.115
B. An Empirical Analysis: Arguments for Those Most Affected
Poletown and Berman are vivid examples of the disproportionate
impact eminent domain may have on ethnic and racial minorities, the
elderly, and the indigent,116 but the takings of two neighborhoods do little
to validate the claim of a disproportionate impact. The statistical reality is
that between three and four million Americans have been forced from their
homes by eminent domain since World War II.117 The majority of those
110. See id. at 187 (proposing a balancing test that the court used to find public use in
this private-for-private taking).
111. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 471 (explaining that retaining and adding jobs was
important to economic growth and therefore satisfied the public use requirement).
112. See Ulen, supra note 107, at 186 (citing that the Poles in the neighborhood said
that they would be unable to relocate to another area to form a similar type of community).
113. See Michael Rikon, Bulldozers at Your Doorstep: The Debris of Kelo v. City of
New London, in CURRENT CONDEMNATION LAW: TAKINGS, COMPENSATION, AND BENEFITS 7
(Alan T. Ackerman & Darius W. Dynkowski eds., 2d ed.) (explaining how a broad reading
of the Public Use Clause allowed the taking in Poletown to occur).
114. See id.
115. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 460
(Mich. 1981) ("Such public benefit cannot be speculative or marginal but must be clear and
significant if it is to be within the legitimate purpose as stated by the Legislature.").
116. See NAACP-AARP Amicus Brief, supra note 29 (explaining that Berman and
Poletown both demonstrate how eminent domain affects ethnic and racial minorities).
117. See Beito, infra note 145 (explaining the harm that eminent domain policies have
had on ethnic and racial minorities since World War II).

90

19 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 73 (2012)

whose property was taken were ethnic minorities.118 In the years between
1949 and 1973 alone, by using eminent domain for the purposes of blight
eradication or economic development, 2,532 projects were carried out in
992 cities that displaced one million people, two-thirds of them AfricanAmerican.119 At that period, African-Americans were five times more
likely to be displaced than they should have been in their numbers (based
120
Takings in ethnic areas for
upon their representation) in the population.
the purpose of blight eradication was so prevalent, many dubbed it “Negro
121
removal.”
C. The Amicus Brief
The Kelo case gave groups that had disproportionately suffered the
burdens of eminent domain, a platform on which they could express their
grievances and argue for the necessity of a narrow reading of the Public
Use Clause.122 It has been noted that, “Few protested the Kelo ruling more
123
In its amicus brief in Kelo, the NAACP
ardently than the NAACP.”
along with several other parties including the AARP, the Hispanic Alliance
of Atlantic County, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference,
posited that ethnic and racial minorities, the elderly, and the indigent are not
just affected more frequently, but also are affected to a greater degree by
the eminent domain abuses.124 The brief is important because it not only
clearly states the position of both the NAACP and the AARP regarding the
118. See id.
119. See FULLILOVE, supra note 102, at 2 (citing the number of African-American
properties taken between 1949 and 1973 as a result of a non-restrictive reading of the public
use requirement and the Federal Housing Act of 1949).
120. See id. (stating the statistical disadvantage African-Americans faced with takings
in the years the Federal Housing Act was in place).
121. See Beito, infra note 145 (“It was Berman that enabled the massive urban renewal
condemnations of later decades, which many critics dubbed ‘Negro removal’ because they
too tended to target African-Americans.”).
122. See id. (stating that ethnic and racial minority groups used the publicity of Kelo to
express past injustices committed through the less restrictive reading of the public use
requirement).
123. See id. (stating the lasting legal reality of Kelo v. City of New London).
124. See NAACP-AARP Amicus Brief, supra note 29, at *12 (“The very circumstances
that put minorities and the elderly at increased risk of being subjected to eminent domain
power also leave those groups less able to deal with the consequences when such takings
occur.”).
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widening of the Public Use Clause, but it also masterfully notes the
historical impact takings have had on these subject groups.125
After chastising the Connecticut Supreme Court’s then broad
126
the
interpretation of the Public Use Clause, calling it “meaningless,”
brief explained the unfortunate history certain groups have had with
127
The NAACP explained that the government “had
eminent domain.
[been] operating through housing and the highway machine implemented
policies to segregate and maintain the insulation of poor, minority, and
otherwise outcast populations.”128 In Baltimore, of the 10,000 families that
were displaced by such housing and road projects, ninety percent were
African-American.129 Approximately 1,600 African-Americans neighborhoods in total were destroyed by takings projects when the public use was
130
not restrictively defined.
Explaining how minorities have previously been impacted disproportionately, the brief noted a specific quotation that demonstrates the
past mentality of certain condemnors:
We went through the black section between Minneapolis and St. Paul
about four blocks wide and we took out the home of every black man in
that city. And woman and child. In both those cities, practically. It ain’t
there anymore, is it? Nice neat black neighborhood, you know, with
their churches and all and we gave them about $6,000 a house and
131
turned them loose on society.

Evidencing the disproportionate impact of the widening of the public
use, the brief further argued that whenever there are takings for economic
development, those who live in neighborhoods with a high concentration of
125. See id. passim (citing historical cases and statistics of how ethnic and racial
minorities have a disproportionate number of takings).
126. See id. at 6 (explaining that if the public use requirement is fulfilled by the
reorganization of any economic benefit, the requirement becomes meaningless).
127. See id. at 7–8 (citing how African-Americans and other racial minorities have had
their homes and neighborhoods destroyed by abusive takings).
128. Id. at 8 (quoting Kevin Douglas Kuswa, Suburbification, Segregation, and the
Consolidation of the Highway Machine, 3 J.L. SOC'Y 31, 53 (2002)).
129. See id. (demonstrating that minority families in Baltimore suffered widespread and
disproportionate takings abuse) (quoting BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN,
DOWNTOWN, INC.: HOW AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 29 (1989)).
130. See id. (citing the total number of African-American neighborhoods destroyed by
eminent domain) (citing MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK: HOW TEARING UP
CITY NEIGHBORHOODS HURTS AMERICA, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 17 (2004)).
131. Id. at 8.
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racial and ethnic minorities and the elderly will be disproportionately
affected.132 Further, the brief discussed New Jersey cases, where forty
percent of the city’s Latino community lived in a zone targeted for
133
In Mt. Holly Township, New Jersey, “officials
economic development.
have targeted for economic redevelopment a neighborhood in which the
percentage of African-American residents (44%) is twice that of the entire
Township and nearly triple that of Burlington County, and in which the
percentage of Hispanic residents (22%) is more than double that of all Mt.
Holly Township, and more than five times that of the county.”134
Both the NAACP in its amicus brief and Professor Somin, a property
rights scholar who focuses on eminent domain reform, posited that these
groups suffer disproportionately because they have historically lacked a
strong political voice.135 Even with a taking under a narrowly defined
public use requirement, when there is a large condemnation project, the
condemnor searching for property is economically incentivized to take the
cheapest property possible that would still allow for the goals of the
project.136 When the property owner who lives in a poorer ethnic neighborhood does become subject to a taking, the odds are stacked against that
137
They have fewer resources with which to lobby their case, they
person.
are often less politically connected, and have less access to justice.138
132. See id. at 9 (explaining that even without nefarious motives on the part of the
condemnor, those who live in neighborhoods with high concentrations of ethnic and racial
minorities will suffer disproportionately more eminent domain abuse) (citing Dana Berliner,
Condemnations for Private Parties Destroy Black Neighborhoods and Out with the Old:
Elderly Residents are Prime Targets for Eminent Domain Abuses, in PUBLIC POWER,
PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE BY STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 102, 185 (2003)).
133. See id. at 10 (explaining how condemnors near Atlantic City, New Jersey are
planning a condemnation project that affects forty percent of the locality’s Latino
community).
134. Id.
135. See id. at 22 (“Allowing ‘public use’ to include ‘economic development’ renders
the eminent domain power open to abuse to the particular disadvantage of those, such as
amici, who lack economic or political power.”); see also The Civil Rights Implications of
Eminent Domain Abuse: Hearings Before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 5 (2011)
(testimony of Ilya Somin, Assoc. Professor of Law, George Mason Univ.) (explaining that
ethnic and racial minority groups have been victimized, sometimes by racial prejudice and
sometimes by relative political weakness).
136. See id. at 14 (explaining how it is in the government’s interest to take lower cost
housing).
137. See NAACP-AARP Amicus Brief, supra note 29, at *28 (explaining how the
poorer property owner in an ethnic area is given less of a voice in the decision making
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NAACP and AARP’s disproportionate impact argument in their
Amicus Brief did not go unnoticed by Justice Thomas.139 In his dissent in
Kelo, after tracing the evolution of the Takings Clause, he devoted an entire
section of his opinion to noting the disproportionate impact that eminent
domain has had on certain groups.140 Justice Thomas reminded the Court
that minority communities have been targeted by eminent domain, as he
cited statistics concerning urban renewal and blight takings. Finally, he
reminded the Court that over 97% of those forcibly removed in Berman
141
With respect to the harm of the Kelo decision
were African-American.
on those already disproportionately impacted, he wrote “Regrettably, the
predictable consequence of the Court’s decision will be to exacerbate these
effects.”142
IV. The Post-Kelo Legislative Response
In Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo, the Court has stated that it is the duty of
the legislature to determine what constitutes public use, and the judiciary
will have a very narrow role in reviewing that determination.143 Due to the
public interest generated in the wake of Kelo, most states have responded
144
by passing legislation, attempting to better define “public use.”
process).
138. See Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1049
(1970) (discussing that the legal problems the indigent face are different than legal problems
for the more affluent because the poorer person does not have the financial means to
advocate his position).
139. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 522 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (explaining the harm that the widening of the Public Use Clause has already had
on minorities and the poor, and predicting that a future expansion of the clause would
continue such harm).
140. See id. (showing the disproportionate impact that Justice Thomas wrote about in
the Kelo dissent).
141. See id. (stating the disproportionate impact the Berman taking had on minorities).
142. See id. (demonstrating Justice Thomas’s assumptions about the future
disproportionality of takings).
143. See id. at 500 (stating that the role of the judiciary will be very narrow in
determining if a use deemed by the legislature to be a public use satisfies the requirement
(citing Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984)) (quoting Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954))).
144. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 3 (explaining that the majority of states have
enacted constitutional or statutory reforms to better define the limits of the public use
requirement).
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A. The Rush to Reform: Revisited

From 2005 to 2008, forty-two states enacted new laws that limit the
power of eminent domain.145 However, this response, seemingly positive
for the groups disproportionately affected, has drawn criticism for being
drafted in a rushed fashion in effort to quiet public outrage stemming from
Kelo.146 Scholars who have studied the 2006 and 2007 reform laws argue
that they are “ineffective, imposing few or no meaningful constraints on the
147
Professor Somin, who has testified to Congress
use of eminent domain.”
about these measures, notes of the states that have enacted them, “Many of
them forbid takings that transfer property to private parties for ‘economic
development,’ but allow virtually identical condemnations to continue
under other names.”148 For example, numerous states continue to allow
“blight” condemnations under definitions of blight so broad that virtually
149
As a result, their benefit to the groups that have been
any area qualifies.
disproportionately impacted is not as strong as it may have been per150
For example, nineteen states have outlawed takings for solely for
ceived.
economic development but have allowed takings for blight, with blight
being so poorly defined that almost any property would qualify.151
Professor Somin cites California and Texas as examples of states that
152
passed flawed post-Kelo measures.
145. See David T. Beito & Ilya Somin, Op-Ed., Battle over Eminent Domain is Another
Civil Rights Issue, KANSAS CITY STAR, Apr. 27, 2008, http://www.cato.org/pub_
display.php?pubid=9361 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (explaining that since the Kelo decision,
all but eight states have enacted some type of eminent domain reform) (on file with WASH.
& LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
146. See Somin, supra note 10 (“Unfortunately, the majority of the new reform laws are
likely to be inefficient, imposing few or no meaningful constraints on the use of eminent
domain.”).
147. See id. (stating that a large percentage of the 2006 and 2007 post-Kelo eminent
domain reform is ineffective).
148. Id.
149. See id. (stating that blight statutes are meaningless in some states because they can
refer to blighted zones).
150. See id. (stating that the promised benefit of reform measures was not actually
realized once the measures were passed).
151. See Beito, supra note 145 (explaining that there is little impact with reform that
better defines taking for economic development when the same property can be taken under
the guide of alleviating blight).
152. See Somin, supra note 10 (citing examples of states that proposed remedial reform
that proved to be uncomprehensive).
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California is an example of a state that acted quickly to pass post-Kelo
reform, of little actual value.153 The California Court of Appeals in
154
explained that the public use clause
Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes
was originally narrowly restricted, but was later broadened to include
‘public purpose.’ The Court of Appeals stated, “The idea now is that the
taking of the property itself, as distinguished from the subsequent use of
that property, may be required in the public interest.”155 While the California state court appears to use jurisprudence similar to that which the
United States Supreme Court used in the Berman-Midkiff-Kelo trilogy, the
legislature sought to narrow public use in 2008 with Proposition 99, which
was intended to prohibit private residential takings for a private use.156
However the actual text of the amendment states,
(b) The State and local governments are prohibited from acquiring by
eminent domain an owner-occupied residence for the purpose of
157
conveying it to a private person.
(c) Subdivision (b) of this section does not apply when State or local
government exercises the power of eminent domain for the purpose of
protecting public health and safety; preventing serious, repeated
criminal activity; responding to an emergency; or remedying
environmental contamination that poses a threat to public health and
158
safety.
(d) Subdivision (b) of this section does not apply when State or local
government exercises the power of eminent domain for the purpose of
159
acquiring private property for a public work or improvement.
153. See id.
154. Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes, 266 P.2d 105, 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954) (citing
Schneider v. Dist. of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1953)).
155. See CALVERT G. CHIPCHASE, ET AL., STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY OF PUBLIC USE
STANDARDS IN EMINENT DOMAIN: A HANDBOOK OF CONDEMNATION LAW 153, 157 (citing
Schneider v. Dist. of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1953)) (explaining how the
California state courts interpreted the public use requirement before post-Kelo legislative
reform) (quoting Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes, 266 P.2d 105, 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954)).
156. See id. (explaining that Proposition 99 was California’s post-Kelo public use
reform measure).
157. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19, cl. b.
158. Id. at cl. c.
159. Id. at cl. d.
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The amendment is particularly weak in redefining public use, as it
essentially only limits private residential takings for a private use, when the
160
Put
state or locality is not acting with the goal of public improvement.
another way, the amendment could read: a private-to-private residential
taking cannot occur when there is absolutely no public purpose.161 Under
this legislation, blight takings are still acceptable as are any takings where
162
This type of “reform legislation”
there is purported public improvement.
offers almost no benefit to those groups who are disproportionately affected
163
by eminent domain.
Texas is another example of a state that rushed post-Kelo reform.164
The Texas state constitution holds that “[n]o person’s property shall be
taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate
compensation.”165 To better define the public use term, just weeks after the
Kelo decision was announced, the legislature enacted Chapter Number
2005-1 into law. The law purportedly protects taking of private property
stating:
b) A governmental or private entity may not take private property
through the use of eminent domain if the taking: (1) confers a private
benefit on a particular private party through the use of the property; (2)
is for a public use that is merely a pretext to confer a
private benefit
on a particular private party; or (3) is for economic development
purposes, unless the economic development is a secondary purpose
resulting from municipal community development or municipal urban
renewal activities to eliminate an existing affirmative harm on society
166
from slum or blighted areas.

160. See id. ("[T]his section does not apply when State or local government exercises
the power of eminent domain for the purpose of acquiring private property for a public work
or improvement.").
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Beito, supra note 145 (explaining that in many states that enacted postKelo reform restricting takings for economic development, often times the same property
can be taken under the guise of alleviating blight).
163. See Somin, supra note 10 ("Unfortunately, the majority of the new reform laws are
likely to be ineffective, imposing few or no meaningful constraints on the use of eminent
domain.").
164. See id. (citing examples of proposed state remedial reform that did not prove to be
comprehensive).
165. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17.
166. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001.
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Absent from the Texas post-Kelo reform statute is language limiting
the taking to only that property required for the project.167 Therefore, the
Texas law would allow a condemnor to condemn a large parcel for a road
and then transfer any access property not used for the road to a private
owner.168 Texas may have thought itself to be progressive in protecting
property rights. However, as the act allows for property to be transferred to
169
a private party for an economic use, the reform is comparatively weak.
B. Virginia – A Seemingly Successful Model
Compared with the legislative reforms of states like California and
Texas, Virginia’s reform laws are comprehensive.170 In 2006, the Virginia
General Assembly narrowly thwarted an attempt at comparatively weak
171
In 2007, the
reactionary legislation similar to that enacted by Texas.
General Assembly passed a bill that defined public use, specifying that an
increased tax basis or economic development were not to be considered in
making such a determination.172 On February 14, 2012, both houses of the
Virginia General Assembly passed additional legislation that allowed for
lost access and lost business profits that stem from an eminent domain
taking to be compensable.173 Just one day earlier, February 13, 2012, both
houses passed an amendment to the Virginia Constitution that states that
167. See id. (showing that there is no language in the reform law that limits a taking to
only that amount of property that is necessary for a project).
168. See id. (explaining how the Texas reform law still allows for abusive takings).
169. See generally CALVERT G. CHIPCHASE, ET AL., A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY OF
PUBLIC USE STANDARDS IN EMINENT DOMAIN: A HANDBOOK OF CONDEMNATION LAW 153
(surveying all post-Kelo state action and showing that Texas could be seen as comparatively
weak in its reform measures).
170. Compare supra notes 154–156, 162, and accompanying text (explaining the
reforms law enacted in Texas and California), with infra notes 172–192 and accompanying
text (explaining the comprehensiveness of Virginia’s reform laws).
171. See H.R. 94, 504th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2005), available at
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses=061&typ=bil&val=hb94 (showing that the
original language of the first reform bill was defeated in the House of Delegates).
172. See H.R. 2954, 504th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007), available at
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?071+sum+HB2954 (showing that stronger reform
was passed in 2007).
173. See S. 437, 504th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), available at
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses=121&typ=bil&val=sb437 (showing that the
General Assembly passed a bill to make lost access and business losses compensable).
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property rights are fundamental, protects just compensation, and further
defines public use.174
Virginia, like many other states, was quick to act to remedy the Kelo
175
On December 19, 2005, less than six months after the Supreme
decision.
Court ruled in Kelo, Virginia Delegate Terrie Suit pre-filed House Bill
176
The bill was Virginia’s first attempt at eminent domain reform.177
94.
The bill stated, “Public uses shall not include the taking or damage [sic] of
private property through the exercise of the power of eminent domain if the
primary purpose is the enhancement of tax revenues.”178 It also allowed
that if property is taken for “eminent domain for public uses and is not for
the primary purpose of enhancement of tax revenues,” the property could
then be conveyed to certain private persons or entities.179 Following a contentious floor debate, Delegate Johnny Joannou offered an amendment,
which struck the previous Suite language from the bill.180 Joannou argued
174. See SJ 3 Constitutional Amendment; Taking or Damaging to Private Property for
Public Use (Second Reference). Floor: 02/13/12 Senate: Read Third Time and Agreed to by
the Senate (23-Y 16-N), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+SV0393S
J0003+SJ0003 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the constitutional amendment passed the
Senate of Virginia on Sept. 9, 2012). See also HJ 3 Constitutional Amendment; Taking or
Damaging to Private Property for Public Use (Second Reference). Floor: 02/13/12 House:
Vote: Adoption (80-Y 18-N) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+HV0
666+HJ0003 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the constitutional amendment passed the
Virginia House of Delegates February 13, 2012.); see also HB1035 Eminent Domain:
Definition of Lost Access and Lost Profits, Determining Compensation. Floor: 02/14/12:
House: Vote: Passage (77-Y 22-N) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+
vot+HV0780+HB1035 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the lost access and lost profits
bill passed the House of Delegates on February 14, 2012); see also SB 437 Eminent
Domain; Definitions of Lost Access and Lost Profits, Determining Compensation. Floor:
02/14/12 Senate: Read Third Time and Passed Senate (23-Y, 17-N) http://leg1
.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+ SV0408SB0437+SB0437 (last visited Sept. 9,
2012) (showing the lost access and lost profits bill passed the Senate of Virginia on February
14, 2012) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
175. See H.B. 94 Eminent Domain; Definition of Public Uses. Terrie L. Suit,
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses=061&typ=bil&val=hb94, (last visited Sept. 9,
2012) (showing that Virginia quickly responded to the Kelo decision by enacting reform
legislation) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
176. See id. (showing Delegate Terrie Suit prefiled H.B. 94 on Dec. 19, 2005).
177. See id. (showing the date of the proposed bill for the 2006 session, which would be
first session after Kelo).
178. H.B. 94, 504th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006), available at
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?061+ful+HB94EH1.
179. Id.
180. See Kelo Protection: A Choice of “Two Paths” (Google Video 2006) http://
video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-3237745645661904619 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012)
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that the “primary purpose” language left far too much room to the condemnors to condemn a property for one use and then allow the remainder of
181
the property to be turned over to a private interest for a private use.
Delegate Joannou’s proposed amendment stated,
In determining whether a use constitutes a public use, public benefits or
potential public benefits including economic development or private
development, an increase in the tax base, tax revenues, employment or
182
general economic health and welfare shall not be considered.

Jeremy Hopkins, who exclusively practices eminent domain law in
Virginia, noted in The Real Story of Eminent Domain in Virginia that, at the
time, Delegate Joannou’s “proposed bill represents one of the greatest
attempts at eminent domain reform in Virginia history.”183 Though
Joannou’s amendment passed 50-47, the bill ultimately failed in conference
184
However, the passage of Joannou’s amendment set Virginia
committee.
apart as a state that did not erroneously rush to pass a flawed reform
185
measure.
In 2006, Virginia successfully attempted to derail a weak reform bill,
which would have allowed a condemnor, following certain stipulations, to
take private property and later transfer it to a different private owner.186 In
2007, Virginia stuck with the language of the 2006 Joannou Amendment,
and passed comprehensive reform measures.187 House Bill 2954 was
(showing the debate over the H.B. 94 and Delegate Joannou’s amendment) (on file with
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
181. See id. (demonstrating that the majority of the House of Delegates found the
“primary purpose” language to be too broad).
182. See H.B. 94: Amendments Proposed by the House: Del. Joannou
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?061+amd+HB94AH (last visited Sept. 9, 2012)
(stating Delegate Joannou’s proposed floor amendment that would have considerably
strengthen H.B. 94) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
183. JEREMY P. HOPKINS, VIRGINIA INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, THE REAL STORY OF
EMINENT DOMAIN IN VIRGINIA: THE RISE, FALL, AND UNDETERMINED FUTURE OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE COMMONWEALTH 62 (2006).
184. See H.B. 94, 504th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006), available at
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses=061&typ=bil&val=hb94 (showing that after
Joannou’s language was added on the House floor, the bill later died in conference
committee).
185. See supra notes 148–150 and accompanying text (showing that Virginia was not a
state cited by Professor Somin for rushing eminent domain reform).
186. See supra notes 176–184 and accompanying text (explaining that through the
Joannou amendment, Virginia opted against weak reform measures).
187. See H.B. 2954, 504th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007) (enacted), available at
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offered in 2007 by Delegate Rob Bell.188 The bill defined public use to
include “only the acquisition of property where:
(i) the property is taken for the possession, ownership, occupation, and
enjoyment of property by the public or a public corporation;
(ii) the property is taken for construction, maintenance, or operation of
public facilities by public corporations or by private entities provided
that there is a written agreement with a public corporation providing for
use of the facility by the public;
(iii) the property is taken for the creation or functioning of any public
service corporation, public service company, or railroad;
(iv) the property is taken for the provision of any authorized utility
service by a government utility corporation;
(v) the property is taken for the elimination of blight provided that the
property itself is a blighted property; or
(vi) the property taken is in a redevelopment or conservation area and is
abandoned or the acquisition is needed to clear title where one of the
owners agrees to such acquisition or the acquisition is by agreement of
189
all the owners.”

Therefore, under this bill, not only was public use specifically defined,
but blight takings were to be limited to only those properties that were
190
actually blighted.
It also specifically identified what constitutes public
facilities, citing fifteen very definitive categories, such as “transportation
facilities including highways, roads, streets, and bridges, traffic signals,
relates easements and rights-of-way, mass transit, ports, and any com191
The bill
ponents of federal, state, or local transportation facilities.”
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?071+sum+HB2954 (showing the legislative history of H.B. 2954).
188. See id. (showing that Delegate Rob Bell was the chief patron of the legislation).
189. Id.
190. See id. (stating that the bill defined public use and limited blight takings).
191. Id.
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additionally provided that no more private property than was needed for a
particular project could be taken.192
The strength of the 2007 legislation led to legislative complacency in
Virginia, where from 2007 to 2011, no major pieces of legislation redefined
public use.193 However, since 2007, there had been seven constitutional
amendments proposed to ensure that the public use language passed that
194
On February 13, 2012, both houses of the
year would not be changed.
Virginia General Assembly passed a constitutional amendment protecting
195
Proclaiming that the private property
public use and just compensation.
192. See id. (stating that the bill limited the taking to only that property that would be
used in the project).
193. See generally Virginia Gen. Assembly: Legislative Info. Sys. http://leg1.
state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+men+BIL (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing that
between 2007 and 2011, there were not any public use bills offered in the Virginia General
Assembly) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
194. See HJ 62 Constitutional Amendment; Exercise of Eminent Domain Powers (First
Reference) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?061+sum+HJ62, (last visited Sept. 9,
2012) (showing an eminent domain amendment was offered in 2006 by Delegate Ward
Armstrong); HJ 126 Constitutional Amendment; Exercise of Eminent Domain Powers (First
Reference). http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?061+sum+HJ126, (last visited Sept.
7, 2012) (showing an eminent domain amendment was offered in 2006 by Delegate Melanie
Rapp); SJ 121 Constitutional Amendment; Exercise of Eminent Domain Powers (First
Reference) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?061+sum+SJ121, (last visited Sept. 9,
2012) (showing an eminent domain amendment was offered in 2006 by Senator Stephen
Martin); SJ 139 Constitutional Amendment; Exercise of Eminent Domain Powers (First
Reference) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?061+sum+SJ139, (last visited Sept. 9,
2012) (showing an eminent domain amendment was offered in 2006 by Senator Ken
Cuccinelli); HJ 579 62 Constitutional Amendment; Exercise of Eminent Domain Powers
(First Reference) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe ?071+sum+HJ579, (last visited
Sept. 9, 2012) (showing an eminent domain amendment was offered in 2006 by Delegate
Chris Peace); HJ 714 Constitutional Amendment; Exercise of Eminent Domain Powers
(First Reference) (http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/ legp504.exe?071+sum+HJ714, (last visited
Sept. 9, 2012) (showing an eminent domain amendment was offered in 2006 by Delegate
Melanie Rapp); HJ 722 Constitutional Amendment; Exercise of Eminent Domain Powers
(First Reference) http://leg1.state. va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?071+sum+HJ722, (last visited
Sept. 9, 2012) (showing an eminent domain amendment was offered in 2007 by Delegate
Johnny Joannou ); HJ 723 Constitutional Amendment; Exercise of Eminent Domain Powers
(First Reference) (http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?071+sum+HJ723, (last visited
Sept. 9, 2012) (showing an eminent domain amendment was offered in 2007 be Delegate
Rob Bell) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
195. See SJ 3 Constitutional Amendment; Taking or Damaging to Private Property for
Public Use (Second Reference), Floor: 02/13/12 Senate: Read Third Time and Agreed to by
the Senate (23-Y 16-N), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+SV0393
SJ0003+SJ0003 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the constitutional amendment passed
the Senate of Virginia on February 13, 2012). See also HJ 3 Constitutional Amendment;
Taking or Damaging to Private Property for Public Use (Second Reference). Floor: 02/13/12
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right is fundamental, the amendment states the just compensation “shall be
no less than the value of the property taken, loss of profits and lost access,
196
Regarding public use,
and damages to the residue caused by the taking.”
the amendment states that “a taking or damaging of private property is not
for public use if the primary use if for private gain, private benefit, private
enterprise, increasing jobs, increasing tax revenue, or economic development, except for the elimination of a public nuisance existing on the
property.”197 The condemnor bears the burden of proving that the use is
198
With this language the Virginia
public, without a presumption that it is.
General Assembly ensured Virginia would never see a Kelo-style taking.199
On the day after the amendment was passed, both houses also passed
200
The loss of access
legislation to define both lost access and lost profits.
language does not “create any new right or remedy or diminish any existing
right or remedy other than to allow the body determining just compensation
to consider a change in access in awarding just compensation.”201 While
loss of access was previously compensable, lost profits had not been.202
The bill’s language allows for lost profits, using generally accepted
business principles “for a period not to exceed three years from the date of
House: Vote: Adoption (80-Y 18-N) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?
121+vot+HV0666+HJ0003 (last visited Feb. 29, 2012) (showing the constitutional amendment passed the Virginia House of Delegates February 13, 2012) (on file with WASH. & LEE
J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
196. S.J. 3, 504th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), available at http://leg1.
state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+sum+SJ3.
197. Id.
198. See id. (explaining that the amendment puts the public use presumption on the
condemnor).
199. See id. (showing that the amendment does not allow for a private-for-private
taking for economic use).
200. See HB1035 Eminent Domain: Definition of Lost Access and Lost Profits,
Determining Compensation.
Floor: 02/14/12: House: Vote: Passage (77-Y 22-N)
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+HV0780+HB1035 (last visited Sept. 9,
2012) (showing the lost access and lost profits bill passed the House of Delegates on
February 14, 2012) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.); see also SB 437
Eminent Domain; Definitions of Lost Access and Lost Profits, Determining Compensation.
Floor: 02/14/12 Senate: Read Third Time and Passed Senate (23-Y, 17-N)
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+SV0408SB0437 +SB0437 (last visited
Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the lost access and lost profits bill passed the Senate of Virginia on
February 14, 2012) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
201. H.B. 1035, 504th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), available at http://leg1
.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+sum+HB1035.
202. See id. (showing that business losses are added in the bill, as new language).
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the valuation is suffered.”203 This loss of business profits is a step forward
for Virginia in determining just compensation.204
While many states passed rushed or hasty reform following Kelo,
Virginia took four very calculated legislative steps to define public use and
protect just compensation.205 No other state rejected weak reform in 2006,
passed comprehensive reform defining public use in 2007, passed a
constitutional amendment protecting both public use and just compensation,
and then passed legislation providing for both lost access and lost profits.206
For these reasons, Virginia could easily be seen as a perfect model for post207
Kelo reform.
Reform in Virginia is notable for other reasons besides its result.208
The Virginia Constitution states that an amendment must pass two
consecutively elected bodies of the General Assembly before it is to be
placed on the ballot.209 In 2011, the General Assembly passed the
amendment with a Republican-controlled House of Delegates and
210
In 2012, when it passed for the
Democratic-controlled State Senate.
second time, the Republicans had a majority in both bodies.211 Also of
note, in 2011, the chief sponsor of the amendment in the Republican

203. Id.
204. See id. (noting that previously in Virginia business losses were not compensable in
eminent domain).
205. See discussion infra Part IV.B (stating the reform process in Virginia from 2007–
12).
206. See Chipchase, supra note 21, at 179–80 (showing that Virginia was the only state
to complete these four separate legislation actions).
207. See id. (showing that no other state has Virginia’s four-step approach to reform).
208. See discussion infra Part IV.B (stating the reasons why Virginia reform efforts are
laudable).
209. See Va Const. art XII, § 1 (“Any amendment . . . to this Constitution may be
proposed in the Senate or House of Delegates, and if the same shall be agreed to by a
majority of the members elected to each of the two houses, such proposed amendment or
amendments shall be . . . referred to the General Assembly . . . ”).
210. See Peter Rousselot, Why Virginia Democrats Lost the State Senate, HUFFINGTON
POST, Nov. 9, 2011, www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-rousselot/2001-virginia-elections_b_
1083901.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (stating that democrats lost control of the state
senate in late 2011) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
211. See Anita Kumar, Republicans Take Control of Va. Senate, WASH. POST, Jan. 11,
2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/virginia-politics/post/republicans-take-controlof-va-senate/2012/01/11/gIQAp4JVrP_blog.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (stating that the
Republicans controlled the Senate of Virginia in 2012).
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controlled House of Delegates was a Democrat and the chief sponsor of the
amendment in the Democratic controlled Senate was a Republican.212
There was an argument of necessity made against the amendment, as
some legislators questioned its value when the 2007 legislation seemed
exhaustive.213 The bill’s sponsor, Delegate Rob Bell, answered by stating
that the goal of the legislation, “is to put [the amendment] into the cons214
The opponents of the amendtitution so that it can’t be tinkered with.”
ment claimed that the amendment would raise just compensation and the
215
Thus,
increase would directly lead to infrastructure costs increasing.
taxpayers would have to pay more while they would receive less, due to the
restrictions on what can be taken under a public use.216 The Virginia
Municipal League, the group representing Virginia localities, claimed that
restricting public use to uses that did not include “increasing jobs,
increasing tax revenue or economic development” would allow the “fair
market standard to be voided, and the landowner to dictate the price of the
property.”217 One member of the Virginia House of Delegates even
commented, “It’s going to be a lawyer’s bonanza if it passes, as I expect it

212. See H.J. 693 Constitutional Amendment; Taking or Damaging of Private Property
for Public Use (First Reference), Johnny S. Joannou http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504
.exe?111+sum+HJ693 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the 2011 version of the
amendment was offered in the House of Delegates by a Democrat) (on file with WASH. &
LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.); See also S.J. 307 Constitutional Amendment; Taking or
Damaging of Private Property for Public Use (First Reference): Mark Obenshain
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?111+sum+SJ307 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012)
(showing the 2011 version of the amendment was offered in the Senate of Virginia by a
Republican) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
213. See infra notes 287–92 and accompanying text (stating the objections to reform in
Virginia).
214. See David Sherfinski, Local Resistance Building on Virginia’s Eminent Domain
Change, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes. com/news/2011/nov
/24/local-resistance-building-on-virginias-eminent-dom/?page=all (last visited Sept. 9, 2012)
(stating Delegate Rob Bell’s, the Amendment’s sponsor, reasons for drafting and submitting
the legislation) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
215. See Theis, infra note 241 ("They also say that the new compensation rules will
increase the cost of infrastructure projects.").
216. See id. (stating the argument made by the opponents of the reform legislation that
the reform will ultimately harm tax payers).
217. See Sherfinski, supra note 214 (showing that the Virginia Municipal League is
making the argument that restricting the public use standard back to how it was interpreted
pre-Berman would somehow void the fair market standard).
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will.”218 Overcoming these arguments, the amendment and its companion
bill passed both houses.219
C. The Hidden Weaknesses of the Virginia Model
While the strength of the Virginia model is its comparative thoroughness, compared to other states’ legislation, its weakness is in the manner in
which the reform was passed.220 Missing from the Virginia reform process
was the support of those legislators who represent those most affected by
eminent domain.221 Also conspicuously absent from the process was the
grassroots support of the groups that made the opposition to Kelo so
222
223
noteworthy. In Virginia, Kelo’s “strange bedfellows” never united.
218. See Scott McCaffrey, County Officials, Legislators Brace for Battle on EminentDomain Amendment, SUN GAZETTE, Jan. 4, 2012, http://www.sungazette.net/arlington
/news/county-officials-legislators-brace-for-battle-on-eminent-domain-amendment/article_
bb5bd992-36d1-11e1-a57c-001871e3ce6c.html, (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (stating Delegate
Bob Brink’s claim that passage of the eminent domain amendment would dramatically
increase property rights litigation) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
219. See SJ 3 Constitutional Amendment; Taking or Damaging to Private Property for
Public Use (Second Reference). Floor: 02/13/12 Senate: Read Third Time and Agreed to by
the Senate (23-Y 16-N), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+SV0393SJ0003
+SJ0003 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the constitutional amendment passed the
Senate of Virginia on February 13, 2012); see also HJ 3 Constitutional Amendment; Taking
or Damaging to Private Property for Public Use (Second Reference). Floor: 02/13/12 House:
Vote: Adoption (80-Y 18-N) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+HV0666
+HJ0003 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the constitutional amendment passed the
Virginia House of Delegates February 13, 2012.); see also HB1035 Eminent Domain:
Definition of Lost Access and Lost Profits, Determining Compensation. Floor: 02/14/12:
House: Vote: Passage (77-Y 22-N) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+
HV0780+HB1035 (last visited Sept. 7, 2012) (showing the lost access and lost profits bill
passed the House of Delegates on February 14, 2012); see also SB 437 Eminent Domain;
Definitions of Lost Access and Lost Profits, Determining Compensation. Floor: 02/14/12
Senate: Read Third Time and Passed Senate (23-Y, 17-N) http://leg1.state.va.us/cgibin/legp504.exe?121+vot+SV0408SB0437+SB0437 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the
lost access and lost profits bill passed the Senate of Virginia on February 14, 2012) (on file
with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
220. See infra notes 241–42 and accompanying text (explaining the success of the
legislative weaknesses of reform in Virginia).
221. See infra notes 225–38 and accompanying text (stating that no members who
represent minority-majority districts patroned reform and showing that many of these
members opposed reform measures).
222. See discussion, infra Part III.C (discussing the arguments made by the NAACP
and the AARP in support of the petitioner’s potion in Kelo).
223. See discussion, infra Part III.C (stating that in the Virginia reform process, the
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From 2006 through 2012, legislators representing minority communities rarely supported reform measures.224 In 2006, when Delegate
Joannou’s amendment was offered to strengthen the otherwise weak
attempt at post-Kelo reform, of the eleven African-Americans in the House
of Delegates that session, seven voted against it.225 The Bill was then
adopted in the House by a vote of 51-45 with eight of the nine voting
226
African-American Delegates voting against eminent domain reform.
The following year House Bill 2954, like the 2006 bill, did not have a
227
The bill passed the House of
single African-American co-patron.
Delegates 87-11; of the eleven members voting not to support reform, five
were African-Americans who represented minority majority districts.228
When the bill reached the Senate, there was an amendment to lessen the
229
This
restrictions for a blight taking proposed by the House of Delegates.
amendment was agreed to 18-17, with all four African-American members
230
who represented minority-majority districts agreeing to it.

political left never supported the efforts of those offering the legislation).
224. See infra notes 225–38 and accompanying text (showing that none of the postKelo reform measures were strongly supported by the minority-majority members of the
Virginia General Assembly).
225. See H.B. 94, 2006 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgibin/legp504.exe?061+vot+HV2933+HB0094 (last visited Jan. 5, 2012) (showing that of the
eleven African-American members in the Virginia House of Delegates in 2006, Delegates
BaCote, Dance, Howell, A.T., Jones, D.C., McClellan, McEachin, and Melvin voted against
Delegate Jouannou’s more restrictive public use amendment) (on file with WASH. & LEE J.
CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
226. See id., http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?061+vot+HV2933+HB0094
(last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing nine of the eleven African-American members in the
Virginia House of Delegates in 2006 voted against eminent domain reform) (on file with
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
227. See H.B. 2954, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007),
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?071+mbr+HB2954 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012)
(demonstrating that of the sixteen co-patrons, none were African-American) (on file with
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
228. See id. (showing that of the ten votes against the eminent domain reform bill,
African-American Delegates BaCote, McClellan, Melvin, Spruill, and Ward voted or
intended to vote against it).
229. See id. (showing an amendment proposed by Sen. Williams to lessen the blight
language of the original bill).
230. See id. (showing state senators Lambert, Lucas, Marsh, and Miller all voting for
the amendment lessening the restrictions on a blight taking).
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In 2011, Virginia first proposed a constitutional amendment to ensure
the definition of public use could not be changed in the future.231 The
232
Of the votes cast
amendment passed the House of Delegates 18-8.
against the reform amendment, four were from African-Americans and five
were from those who represented minority majority districts.233 The
amendment then passed the Senate of Virginia 31-8, where no AfricanAmericans supported the bill, with five of the eight negative votes coming
from African-Americans.234
Pursuant to the Virginia Constitution, the constitutional amendment
that passed the General Assembly in 2011 had to pass both bodies, in its
identical form again in 2012.235 In 2012 as in 2011, the amendment did not
236
It was then
receive a single African-American co-patron in either body.
opposed by every African-American member of the State Senate.237 In the
House of Delegates in 2012, of the eighteen votes against the amendment,

231. H.J. 693, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2011).
232. See H.J. 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2011), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgibin/legp504.exe?111+vot+SV0614HJ0693+HJ0693 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the
vote count for the second passage of H.J. 693) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. &
SOC. JUST.).
233. See id. (showing that of those members who voted against the bill Delegates
Dance, Herring, McClellan, and James are African, and Morrissey represents a minority
majority district).
234. See H.J. 693, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2011),
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?111+vot+SV0614HJ0693+HJ0693, (last visited
Sept. 9. 2012) (showing state senators Locke, Lucas, Marsh, McEachin, and Miller, all five
African-American members of the Senate of Virginia voting against reform).
235. See VA CONST. art XII, §1 (“Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution
may be proposed in the Senate or House of Delegates, and if the same shall be agreed to by a
majority of the members elected to each of the two houses, such proposed amendment or
amendments shall be entered on their journals, the name of each member and how he voted
to be recorded, and referred to the General Assembly at its first regular session held after the
next general election of members of the House of Delegates.”).
236. See S.J. Res. 3, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), http://leg1.state.
va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+mbr+SJ3 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing there were not
any African-American co-patrons) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.);
see also Constitutional amendment; H.J. Res. 3, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012),
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121 +mbr+HJ3 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012)
(showing there were not any African-American co-patrons) (on file with WASH. & LEE J.
CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
237. See id. (showing Senators Locke, Lucas, March, McEachin and Miller all voting
against the measure).
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one-third came from members who represent minority-majority
constituencies.238
Like the amendment, the bill defining lost access and business losses
did not receive a single African-American co-patron or a single AfricanAmerican vote in the Senate of Virginia. In the House of Delegates, of the
twenty-two votes against the bill, eight came from members who represent
minority-majority districts.239
Virginia’s constitutional amendment received both support and
240
The Virginia Municipal
opposition from well-funded lobbying efforts.
League lobbied the General Assembly against the amendment arguing that
it was too far reaching and that it would increase the costs of infrastructure
improvements.241 Conversely, the Virginia Farm Bureau made the eminent
domain amendment a top priority on its legislative agenda.242 The group
organized grassroots support for the measure and lobbied professionally for
243
While groups like the Farm Bureau and the Virginia Proits passage.
perty Rights Coalition actively supported reform, advocacy groups like the
NAACP and the AARP did not participate in the discussion.244 Neither of
these groups, which traditionally lobby the Virginia General Assembly,
238. See H.J. Res. 3, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), http://leg1.state.va.us/
cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+vot+HV0666+HJ0003 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing onethird of African-American Delegates in the House of Delegates opposing the measure) (on
file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
239. Id.
240. See infra note 241 (showing that both the Virginia Farm Bureau and the Virginia
Municipal League both lobbied the Virginia General Assembly regarding eminent domain
reform).
241. See Michael Theis, Eminent Domain Changes Spook Cities, THE FREDERICKSBURG
PATCH, Nov. 28, 2011, http://fredericksburg.patch.com/articles/eminent-domain-changesspook-cities (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (“The Virginia Municipal League, which lobbies on
behalf of Virginia's 38 independent cities, say the proposed amendment is unnecessary and
could lead to frivolous lawsuits and more costly public improvements.”) (on file with WASH.
& LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
242. See Eminent Domain Constitutional Amendment Passes in Senate, House,
VIRGINIA FARMS BUREAU, http://vafarmbureau.org/NewsVideo/NewsHeadlines/tabid/347/
articleType/ArticleView/articleId/688/Eminent_domain_constitutional_amendment_passes_i
n_Senate_House.aspx (visited Sept. 9, 2012) (explaining that the eminent domain
amendment was a top priority of the Virginia Farm Bureau in 2012) (on file with WASH. &
LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
243. See id. (stating how the Virginia Farm Bureau was supporting the reform
measure).
244. See infra note 248 and accompanying text (showing that the NAACP and AARP
were silent on reform measures).
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organized grassroots support or employed professional lobbyists to advocate for reform.245 On its website, the Virginia chapter of the AARP lists
246
The
its legislative priorities for each session of the General Assembly.
2012 list did not include any references to eminent domain reform.247 A
sponsor of the amendment, Delegate Rob Bell, stated that the groups that
traditionally support the interest of ethnic and racial minorities, the elderly,
or the indigent were silent on the reform measures.248
V. Proposing a Stronger, More Inclusive Model
This Note asserts that while Virginia has seemingly been successful in
its post-Kelo eminent domain reform measures, the state’s legislative
actions exhibit a flawed model.249 In furthering its assertion that Virginia’s
model for reform should be improved upon, this Note proposes that for
reform that is inclusive, understandable, and accessible, those who are
advocating for it must encourage involvement among those who have been
250
Reform is not successful because it simply becomes law;
most affected.
to be successful reform must include those most affected and be responsive
to their needs.251 Those advancing reform in states contemplating postKelo legislative actions would be well advised to solicit the advocacy and

245. See id. (showing that these groups took made no efforts to lobby the General
Assembly for the eminent domain amendment).
246. See AARP Is Fighting for You at the Virginia General Assembly, AARP,
http://www.aarp.org/politics-society/advocacy/info-01-2012/fighting-for-you-va1788.html
(last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing AARP’s legislative priorities for 2012).
247. See id. (showing that the eminent domain amendment is not listed as a priority for
the AARP in 2012).
248. See Telephone Interview with Delegate Robert Bell, Member, Virginia House of
Delegates (Feb. 18, 2012) (on file with the WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.)
(explaining that the AARP, the NAACP, and other groups that regularly advocate for the
interests of ethnic and racial minorities, the elderly, and the indigent did not lobby or
advocate for any of the Virginia eminent domain measures).
249. See discussion supra Part IV.C (discussing the flaws in the Virginia model for
eminent domain reform).
250. See infra notes 268–98 and accompanying text (discussing proposals to better
eminent domain reform).
251. See discussion supra Part IV.C (discussing that reform in Virginia included
measures that were not specific to those most affected).
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political support of those most statistically affected by eminent domain
before passing remedial measures.252
There are several reasons why the support of these disproportionately
affected groups matter. First, those proposing reform may need the votes of
those representing the disproportionately affected, in order to have the
253
In Virginia, the
majorities necessary for the bills to be enacted.
Republicans who supported reform were able to garner enough votes from
certain Democrats to pass the 2007 and 2012 bills and the pass the 2011-12
amendment.254 However, in 2012, the amendment barely passed the Senate, 23-17.255 While Virginia had the votes necessary to push the
amendment against the will of members representing disproportionately
affected groups, other states may not have a similar luxury, and support
from these key groups may be critical to get reform measures passed.256
Second, the uniting of diverse political interests in support of eminent
257
This increase in attention
domain draws attention to property rights.
leads to greater advocacy. The Kelo controversy spurred support from both
the political right and left.258 In part, it was this uniting of the constitutionalists with the minority interests that attracted so much attention to
259
When seemingly diverse interests aligned, more people became
Kelo.
interested in property rights, a topic that, prior to Kelo, was previously
252. See discussion supra Part III.B (stating that statistically ethnic and racial
minorities, the elderly, and the indigent have historically been most adversely affected by the
broadening of the Public Use Clause).
253. See supra notes 235–37 accompanying text (explaining that the amendment nearly
failed in the Senate of Virginia in 2012).
254. See discussion supra Part IV.C (noting that in both 2011 and 2012 the majority of
support for the amendment came from Republicans in both houses and that the bills were
primarily patroned and co-patroned by Republicans).
255. See supra notes 235–37 and accompanying text (showing that in 2012 the
amendment barely passed the Senate of Virginia).
256. See 2010 Post-Election Control of Legislatures, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/2010-postelection-con
trol-of-legislatures.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing those states in which the
legislatures are controlled by Republicans, Democrats, and those states where legislative
control is split) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
257. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11 and accompanying text (stating that the uniting of
strange bedfellows brought attention to Kelo).
258. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (showing those groups that supported
the Petitioner in Kelo).
259. See Gillespie, supra note 12 (explaining the seemingly unlikely political alliances
that were formed as a result of the publicity surrounding Kelo v. City of New London
generated more publicity for the case).
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politically stagnant.260 In Virginia, the amendment attracted media attention as the interests of groups such as the Virginia Farm Bureau were at
261
odds with interests such as those of the Virginia Municipal League.
States contemplating future reform should not just focus on gaining the
support of conservative groups, but should also acquire support from
groups that commonly represent the needs of ethnic and racial minorities,
the elderly, and the indigent such as the AARP and the NAACP. The
fusion of these diverse groups will naturally draw more attention and
support to property rights issues.262
Third, by including those most affected in process, those advocating
reform greatly increase the strength of their lobbying ability. In Virginia
there was not any professional lobbying for eminent domain reform on
behalf of ethnic and racial minorities, the elderly, and the indigent.263
Advocacy groups like the Farm Bureau lobbied for the constitutional
amendment, but their political voice would have been stronger had they
been joined by groups representing those who have been most affected by
eminent domain.264 Strong lobbying also reminds legislators that, even
265
In Virginia
after Kelo, the public still cares about the property rights.
some legislators who represented minority-majority districts felt that
eminent domain reform was not an issue of importance to their constituencies.266 This problem could be remedied if those who have been most
affected effectively lobby their legislators. In the future, states considering
reform should recognize that including those most affected in the reform
process greatly strengthens the lobbying effort.
260. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11 at 3 (demonstrating the decade long complacency with
property rights had ended).
261. See Theis, supra note 241 (demonstrating that lobbying efforts supporting and
opposing reform and the media attention resulting from those efforts).
262. See Gillespie, supra note 12 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the
uniting of diverse groups draws attention to reform).
263. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (stating amendment patron Rob Bell
noting that those who commonly lobby for concerns of ethnic and racial minorities, the
elderly, and the indigent were not active in the reform process).
264. See infra note 274 and accompanying text (stating the support of the Virginia
Farm Bureau in lobbying for the amendment in Virginia).
265. See infra note 291 and accompanying text (stating that Virginia Delegate Lionell
Spruill Sr. thinks that most of his constituents feel as though eminent domain takings are no
longer a major race issue that constituents are concerned with).
266. See id. (stating that Virginia Delegate Lionell Spruill Sr. felt as though eminent
domain reform was not a major issue for his constituents).
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Fourth, the inclusion of those most affected by eminent domain in the
legislative process could make the reform laws more effective. Virginia
passed legislation in 2012 to allow for lost access and business losses to be
compensable as parts of just compensation.267 While the lost access issue
may be of importance for those most affected by the broadening of the
Public Use Clause, it is doubtful that lost business uses are particularly
meaningful. There are issues and remedies that could be of importance to
those most affected that were not considered in Virginia because those most
affected were not active in the reform process.268 Once those who are most
affected, are participating in the reform process, they can easily share their
ideas on how to protect both public use and just compensation.
A. Education
This Note proposes that education is the first step in successfully
reuniting Kelo’s strange bedfellows. In building a broad cross-section of
support for eminent domain reform, this Note offers that a few key realities
must be addressed. Compared to many issues that are lobbied for on the
state level by ethnic and racial minorities, the elderly, and the indigent,
eminent domain reform could be seen as esoteric or recondite.269 In
explaining how complex the concept of property is, property law scholar
Richard Pipes wrote, “discussions of property from the time of Plato and
Aristotle to the present have revolved around four principle themes: its
relation to politics, ethics, economics, and psychology.”270 Even at a base
level property rights are opaque.271 With property rights reform, there is
272
Recent survey data to
both mass general ignorance and mass confusion.
267. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (showing that in 2012 Virginia passed
laws to allow for business losses and lost access to be compensable under just
compensation).
268. See discussion infra Part III.C (discussing how the issues of those most affected
were not communicated in the Virginia reform process).
269. See infra note 270 and accompanying text (stating that concepts are property rights
are conceptually difficult to grasp).
270. See RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 4 (Vintage Books 1st ed. 2000)
(stating that there are traditionally four themes in viewing property rights).
271. See id. (showing that the conceptualization of property rights involves understanding of various academic disciplines).
272. See Somin, supra note 10 (“The ineffectiveness of post-Kelo reforms is part
caused by public ignorance.”).
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show that “only 13% of Americans know whether their state has enacted a
post-Kelo eminent domain reform law and whether that law is likely to be
273
effective or not.
This situation, in which people are historically affected by an issue that
is not understood, invites education. There are very concrete simple
solutions to remedy these situations of ignorance and confusion. Those
interested in reform should speak at local meetings and meet with decision
makers of the groups most statistically affected, prior to the measures
coming before the legislatures. They should also share with those individuals and groups the arguments made in the amicus brief by the
NAACP and AARP in 2005. The section of the Justice Thomas’s dissent
addressing these issues should be disseminated. In addition, those interested
in reform should find abusive takings cases within the state in which they
are advocating reform and have the victims of those takings speak with
these advocacy groups. Former Virginia State Senator, now Attorney
General, Ken Cuccinelli, a major advocate of post-Kelo reform, successfully met the Farm Bureau to educate its members on the eminent domain
issues and how they could lobby for reform in Virginia.274 In the future this
type of action needs to be taken with those most affected as well.
B. Lobbying Efforts
Having a strong lobby for reform is not only a benefit of the fusion of
Kelo’s bedfellows, it also a step in further uniting diverse political entities.
When those interested in eminent domain reform think about the state
legislative process, it must be remembered that eminent domain is one of
many diverse issues that must be addressed and voted on in a very short
amount of time. Since eminent domain is not addressed every year, it is a
mistake to assume legislators comprehensively understand the issue. Often
state legislative sessions are truncated.275 In Virginia, in odd years the
273. See id. (explaining that large majorities of people surveyed do not know if their
state has passed post-Kelo reform).
274. See Virginia Growers Continue to Push for Eminent Domain Reform, SOUTHEAST
FARM PRESS, Feb. 2, 2012, http://southeastfarmpress.com/government/virginia-growerscontinue-push-eminent-domain-reform (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (demonstrating Attorney
General Ken Cuccinelli encouraging the Farm Bureau to lobby for eminent domain reform
in Virginia) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
275. See VA. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (stating that the legislative sessions may be truncated).
The Virginia Constitution states:
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session lasts for only thirty days, in even years, when the General Assembly
is tasked with proposing a state budget, the session lasts for 60 days.276 In
the 2012 Virginia General Assembly session there were 2,698 pieces of
legislation offered that each house considered in 60 days or roughly 45 bills
per day.277 Given the number of bills that come before the legislature and
the complexity of many of these bills, members do not have the time to
278
Therefore, arguments on begrasp the complexities of all these issues.
half of reform should be made on behalf of those most affected before the
session starts so that members can encourage other members to support
such reform. Once the session starts, lobbying groups should regularly try
to inform members that reform is an important issue given the history of
eminent domain. As Attorney General Cucinelli recommended to the Farm
Bureau,279 once the session has started, those supporting reform should
lobby at the state house. In encouraging advocacy in Virginia, Cuccinelli
stated that, “There is no substitute to being present . . . e-mails don’t com280
pare to a good, solid handshake.”
These are simplistic steps at encouraging inclusive comprehensive reform, but these actions were not taken
281
in Virginia by those most statistically affected.

Except as herein provided for reconvened sessions, no regular session of the
General Assembly convened in an even-numbered year shall continue longer
than sixty days; no regular session of the General Assembly convened in an oddnumbered year shall continue longer than thirty days; but with the concurrence
of two-thirds of the members elected to each house, any regular session may be
extended for a period not exceeding thirty days.
Id.
276. See id. (stating the number of days in a session of the Virginia General Assembly).
277. See generally Virginia General Assembly: Legislative Information System,
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?121+men+BIL (last visited Sept. 9, 2012)
(showing that in the 2012 session of the Virginia General Assembly 2,698 pieces of
legislation were offered) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
278. See id. (showing the number of bills taken up by either body on a given day).
279. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (showing Attorney General Cuccinelli
instructing the Farm Bureau on how to lobby in Virginia).
280. See id. (showing Cuccinelli not just encouraging the group but instructing them on
how to advocate).
281. See discussion infra Part III.C (discussing how those who are most affected by the
broadening of the Public Use Clause did not participate in reform in Virginia).
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C. Co-Patrons
Another way to build broad support would be to have major eminent
domain bills offered by diverse sponsors. In Virginia, in 2012, the
amendment was carried by conservative State Senator Mark Obenshain in
the Senate and conservative Delegate Rob Bell in the House of
Delegates.282 By contrast, on February 28, 2012, the House of
Representatives again proved the power of “strange bedfellows” aligning as
that body passed an eminent domain measures that was sponsored by an
African-American Democrat, Maxine Waters, and a white Republican, Jim
Sensenbrenner.283 Representative Sensenbrenner stated, “This is a
Sensenbrenner-Waters bill. You will never see another SensenbrennerWaters bill, and that is probably one of the best reasons to vote in favor of
it.”284 True to the strength of the “strange bedfellows” idea, Representative
Waters stated that she supported the measure because she thought it would
be beneficial to the poor and to those most affect by the Kelo decision.285
Similar to the reasons given by the NAACP for opposing a widening of the
Public Use Clause, Representative Waters added, “The government now
has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those
with more. The founders cannot have intended this perverse result.”286
Excluding the fact that Virginia voted on its amendment February 13, 2012
and the House of Representatives acted on its legislation February 28, 2012,
the House provided an example of “strange bedfellows” uniting that
Virginia should have followed.287
282. See S.J. 3, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgibin/legp504.exe?121+vot+SV0393SJ0003+SJ0003 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing
Senator Mark Obenshain as the patron of the Senate version of the amendment) (on file with
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.); H.J. 3, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va.
2011), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe? 121+vot+HV0666+HJ0003 (last visited
Sept. 9, 2012) (showing Delegate Robert Bell as the patron of the House version of the
amendment) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
283. See Pete Kasperowicz, House Votes to Overturn Supreme Court Decision on
Eminent Domain, THE HILL’S FLOOR ACTION BLOG, Feb. 28, 2012, http://thehill.com/blogs
/floor-action/house/213129-house-votes-to-overturn-supreme-court-property-rights-decision
(last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing that the United States House of Representatives passed
a reform bill that was sponsored by a African-American Democrat and a white Republican)
(on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
284. See id. (showing the value of diverse political interests working together for
eminent domain reform).
285. See id. (stating the reasons why Rep. Waters supported eminent domain reform).
286. See id. (showing Representative Waters identifying those concerns previously
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D. Reviving the 2005 Arguments

Strong reforms include being able to understand and respond to the
opposition’s arguments. This Note has explained that those most affected
by reform were active in expressing opposition to Kelo. The question
becomes: Why were these groups opposed to reform in Virginia? There are
a few possible answers to this question. First, there is the pragmatic answer,
which was often written about in Virginia newspapers.288 The argument is
that eminent domain reform is harmful to the localities. 289 It raises the
costs of projects, it burdens the locality’s ability to grow economically, and
290
These issues
it hampers the town’s desire to eradicate unsightly blight.
are of specific importance to African-American legislators representing
minority-majority communities, because they often represent urban
areas.291 Additionally, while it is clear that takings had a regrettable
negative impact on African-Americans, some African-American legislators
believe that the era of takings based on racial discrimination has passed.292
Anecdotally, African-American leaders may not feel that the racial threat is
still prevalent, regardless of statistics or the language of the NAACP dissent
in Kelo.293
identified by the NAACP-AARP brief as reasons for supporting reform).
287. See discussion infra Part IV.C (showing that in Virginia there was never an
alignment of the political forces as there was in the United States House of Representatives).
288. See Michael Theis, Eminent Domain Changes Spook Cities, THE FREDERICKSBURG
PATCH, Nov. 28, 2011, http://fredericksburg.patch.com/articles/eminent-domain-changesspook-cities (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (demonstrating the arguments made by groups such
as the Virginia Municipal League that eminent domain reform could be infrastructure
improvements more costly for localities) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC.
JUST.).
289. See id. ("The Virginia Municipal League, which lobbies on behalf of Virginia's 38
independent cities, say the proposed amendment is unnecessary and could lead to frivolous
lawsuits and more costly public improvements.").
290. See id. (stating the arguments against eminent domain reform).
291. See Commonwealth of Virginia Division of Legislative Services, REDISTRICTING
2010, http://redistricting.dls.virginia.gov/2010/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing that the
majority of minority-majority districts in the Virginia encompass urban areas) (on file with
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
292. See Telephone Interview with Delegate Lionell Spruill Sr., Member, Virginia
House of Delegates (Jan. 5, 2012) (on file with the on file with the WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL
RTS. & SOC. JUST.) (stating that racial takings are no longer considered to the be the issue
they once were).
293. See id. (stating that Delegate Lionell Spruill Sr. does not think that Virginia is still
in a period where there are massive race-based takings).
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These theoretical explanations for why reform was not advocated for
in Virginia by those most affected fail to address the reality that the
arguments made in the amicus brief simply were not offered during the
reform process in Virginia.294 The amicus brief provides a structural
roadmap for advancing arguments that should be addressed in the future by
295
The amicus brief and Justice Thomas’s disstates considering reform.
sent both make clear that: 1) A broad reading of the Public Use Clause
disproportionately affects ethnic and racial minorities, the elderly, and the
indigent and 2) When a taking affects a member of one of those groups the
degree of impact from the taking is greater.296 In the future, those proposing eminent domain reform should rely on the arguments made in the
NAACP Brief and the arguments made by Justice Thomas to counter any
opposition.
E. New Proposals
In order for reform to be exhaustive, a variety of interests must be
addressed. In the future, when states consider eminent domain reform, this
Note argues that it would be most effective to hear the concerns of those
most affected. The concerns of those disproportionately impacted may be
vastly different from those proposing reform legislation.297 In the second
round of reform in Virginia, the state took steps to make access and
business losses compensable.298 While access losses may be beneficial to
members of disproportionally affected groups, it is doubtful that the
compensability of future business losses will have a significant impact. This
Note does not argue against making business losses compensable, it simply
294. See discussion supra Part IV.C (stating that those who traditionally represent the
interests of minorities, the indigent, and the elderly were not part of the reform process in
Virginia).
295. See discussion supra Part III.C (showing the NAACP Amicus Brief outlines the
harms the widening of the Public Use Clause has had on ethnic and racial minorities, the
indigent, and the elderly).
296. See discussion supra Part III.C (showing the harm and degree the widening of the
Public Clause has on those most affected); see supra note 138 and accompanying text
(stating how Justice Thomas assumes an increasing in the widening of the Public Use Clause
will have a detrimental effect on those already most affected by eminent domain).
297. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (showing that in 2012 Virginia proposed
legislation to allow for future business losses to be compensable).
298. See id. (showing that in 2012 Virginia proposed legislation to allow for lost access
and business losses to be considered for just compensation).
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points out that these are losses that are not of particular relevance to those
most affected.
If a state were to engage in reform and would include those most
affected, in addition to the compensability of these losses, a state could
entertain the issue of allowing for attorney’s fees to be compensable in
eminent domain litigation. The provision for attorney’s fees would have a
direct impact on these vulnerable groups, because without them, a just
compensation award is not truly just, as attorney’s fees must be subtracted
from whatever the jury determines as the value of the property. If the party
subject to the take hires a lawyer on a one-third contingency fee, his actual
gross award will be inevitably less than what is just. However, if the party
subject to the take does not retain an attorney, they could be left with an
offer far less than just compensation minus attorney’s fees.
Where there are only so many eminent domain lawyers in an area,
there is a certain level of economy in the cases they take.299 Where property values are lower, the attorney has less of an incentive for taking the
case. These are the type of problems that could be raised if those most
historically affected by takings were involved in the solution process. The
issue is not per se whether Virginia should have included business takings
and should be discussed in reform. The fact that Virginia passed reform
without even considering such ideas proves that the Virginia model is
flawed. Takings issues had affected certain groups more than others for
specific reasons. Therefore, those most subject to takings should be instrumental in the reform decisions.
VI. Conclusion
After the Berman-Midkiff-Kelo trilogy whittled away the Fifth
Amendment Public Use Clause to what Justice Thomas called a “virtual
nullity,”300 Virginia and forty-one other states then passed various forms of
state eminent domain reform.301 The legislative action in Virginia is
299. See generally OWNERS’ COUNSEL OF AMERICA, http://www.ownerscounsel.com/
(last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (showing the number of attorneys who exclusively practice
eminent domain law in certain states).
300. See Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 506 (2005) (“Today's
decision is simply the latest in a string of our cases construing the Public Use Clause to be a
virtual nullity, without the slightest nod to its original meaning.”).
301. See Somin, supra note 10 (explaining that forty-two states have enacted legislation
protecting property rights after 2005).
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laudable as the state distinguished itself as the only state to resist
comparatively weak reactionary reform, pass strong comprehensive reform,
and then pass both a constitutional amendment protecting eminent domain
and additional legislation that better ensured just compensation.302 With all
of its success, Virginia missed a golden opportunity to include those who
have been most impacted by eminent domain in its reform measures.303 In
the future states should not follow the Virginia model, but instead, should
unite the “strange bedfellows” that were brought together by Kelo. In order
for future state action to be truly successful, the legislative reform process
cannot forsake the voices of those most affected.

302. See discussion supra Part IV.B (discussing Virginia’s comparative legislative
successes).
303. See discussion supra Part IV.C (discussing weaknesses in the Virginia model).

